mechanics and examines the extent to which Americans employed Newtonian metaphors. This historical question, which focuses on language, tends to blur into the functional question whether the Constitution is actually a Newtonian machine. Although at least one historian has attempted to separate these strands,21 they are related: the claim is that the use of mechanical metaphors and the identity between the Constitution and a machine are both the result of the extraordinary completeness of the mechanical world-view.
One of the first commentators to explore the phenomenon of discussing the American Constitution in terms of the organic and the mechanical was Woodrow Wilson. Writing in I908, Wilson argued that "[t]he government of the United States was . . . a sort of unconscious copy of the Newtonian theory of the universe."22 Under the theory of checks and balances, Wilson claimed, "[p]olitics is turned into mechanics," and " [t] he theory of gravitation is supreme."23 He did not explicitly state that the mechanical ideas current at the time of the founding replaced organic metaphors, but he did argue that the mechanical and the organic are directly opposed to each other: "The trouble with the theory is that government is not a machine, but a living thing. ...
It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton."24 Although this statement focuses on the question of the actual nature of the Constitution rather than the metaphors that contemporaries used to describe it, Wilson's theory illustrates the appeal of the organic/ mechanical categorization and the way that it tends to shape debate.
In fact, a great number of twentieth-century historians writing after Wilson's pronouncement have asserted that the metaphorical field of mechanics was prevalent at the time of the founding and that this field both expressed the world-view of the period and influenced the structure of the new government. In the early I970s, Martin Landau summarized the hypothesis of historians in the early and middle part of this century:
Historians often suggest that an era is best known by the metaphors it keeps.... One central unifying image seems to distinguish the way men think. In the eighteenth century it was the machine that provided this image, and it was the Newtonian system that was taken as the model .... So strong were these influences that numerous scholars . Three relatively recent discussions of the machine metaphor in late eighteenth-century America attempt to synthesize the mass of historical material. In A Machine That Would Go of Itself, Michael Kammen argues that the use of metaphors for the Constitution -a document that is "bound up with the Union in American minds"37 can be divided into distinct phases. "[T]he notion of a constitution as some sort of machine or engine, had its origins in Newtonian science," and was first used in the I77os and I78os.38 Although he does not seem to view the metaphor as the dominant paradigm of the late eighteenth century, Kammen states that the metaphor continued to appear over the next one hundred years, reaching its "apogee" near the end of the nineteenth century as technology pervaded "the public consciousness."39 Machine metaphors endured for the next fifty years, but Woodrow Wilson's declaration in the first decade of the twentieth century that the nation was a living thing marked a shift to organic metaphors.40 Kammen assigns generalized meanings to these two metaphors that place them in contrast -the machine metaphor as indicating a desire for static perfection, the organic metaphor as favoring adaptiveness and change -and concludes that "the U.S. Constitution is not, and was not meant to be, a machine that would go of 
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These three authors are more ambivalent than most of their predecessors about the dominance of the mechanical metaphor. Kammen does not seem certain that the metaphor was dominant before the mid-nineteenth century; Cohen is more interested in the rubric of "science" than of "mechanics"; and Foley decides that the evidence of direct Newtonian influence on the Constitution is inconclusive, although he does acknowledge that Newtonian ideas were pervasive during the period. Nevertheless, their work does not mark a serious shift in the historiographical trend of viewing the machine metaphor as influential in the founders' political thought and of assuming that the body metaphor had disappeared by that period.54 Like previous historians, Kammen and Foley set up the organic and mechanical categories in opposition to each other when discussing the early twentieth-century shift to a Darwinian paradigm.
Surprisingly, most of these historians do not imbue their categories with a great deal of meaning. The essential clash between the organic and the mechanical is to some degree assumed, considered to be so obvious as to need no elaboration. The general sense that the reader takes away is that the organic metaphor demonstrates a belief in cohesion and hierarchy and that the mechanical metaphor demonstrates a Supporters of King Charles I turned to the body politic metaphor to defend him against attack: after all, how can the body politic survive without a head? One political pamphleteer pointed out the dangers of internal schism: "As the naturall body defends it self against an outward force, but strives not by a schisme . . . within it self; so may the body politick against an outward power, but not ... by one part of it set against the Head . .. ; for that tends to the dissolution of the whole."67 This argument against acephaly was also made in verse: "these Acephalists, who here in stead/Of Prince, set up a State without an Head./Must Feet pronounce a sentence on their Head,/And reare imposthum'd members in his stead?"68 The anonymous author of this poem conveys an air of incredulity at the idea that anyone could contemplate turning against the natural order in this fashion.
The well-established metaphorical field of the body politic did indeed create some difficulties for the King's opponents and Parliament's supporters, but the metaphor ultimately survived their attempts to invalidate it. They sought to prove that Parliament, not the King, was "that to the commonwealth which the soul is to the body,"69 and their verbal acrobatics illustrate the extent to which a strong metaphorical field can shape debate. Henry Parker, writing in 1642, strained the metaphor to argue that the body politic can be decapitated and still survive:
[T]he head naturally doth not more depend upon the body, than that does upon the head . .. ; but it is otherwise with the Head Politicall, for that receives more subsistence from the body than it gives, and being subservient to that, it has no being when that is dissolved, and may be preserved after its dissolution.70 When Newtonian and mechanical metaphors began appearing in eighteenth-century America, they were used to refer to the British constitution or government or to the relationship between Britain and its colonies. Sometimes the metaphor was employed to praise the British system, as when the delegates at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 referred to the "admirable mechanism of the English Constitution."83 However, more often Americans depicted the machine of British government as breaking down: "[Britain] has found out that the great machine will not go any longer without a new wheel. . . . We think she is making it of such materials and workmanship as will tear the whole machine to pieces. We are willing ... to assist with artists and materials .. 81 See MARX, supra note 15, at 164.
HALE, supra note 16, at 8I (quoting THOMAS CRAIG, CONCERNING THE RIGHT OF SUCCES-SION TO THE KINGDOM OF ENGLAND 167 (London, I703)). 74 W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 88 (I965) (quoting WALTER MOYLE, AN ESSAY ON THE LACEDAEMONIAN GOVERNMENT (1698), reprinted in A SELECTION

OF TRACTS BY W. MOYLE I65-88 (London, 1728)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
JOHN ADAMS, THE EARLIEST DIARY OF JOHN ADAMS 72 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1966) (1758). 83 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 278 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
JOHN ADAMS, NOVANGLUS: OR, A HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE WITH AMERICA, FROM ITS ORIGIN, IN 1754, TO THE PRESENT TIME (1774), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES II, IO8 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Charles C. Little and James Brown x85I).
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pointed by the laws . . . to assist in working the great machine of government, erected for their use."85 There are also numerous examples, as the project of independence from Britain progressed, of Americans applying the machine metaphor to their own Constitution and system of government. Interestingly, in contrast to the body metaphors discussed above, these metaphors were usually quite brief and not particularly specific about the comparison being made. For instance, George Washington's apprehensive letter to Alexander Hamilton on August 28, I788 compares the government to a machine only in the most general terms: "I hope the political Machine may be put in motion, without much effort or hazard of miscarrying."86 Hamilton himself employed almost identical language, although he used the machine as a symbol of interdependence, warning that "the 'public burthens' must be so distributed that they do not fall too heavily on parts of the community, lest disorder ensue; 'a shock given to any part of the political machine vibrates through the whole."'87 The I794 description of the Constitution as the "best national machine that is now in existence" is similarly general.88
More specific examples arise in the context of separation of powers and other structural concepts. In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton used a machine metaphor to explain an objection to making a separate branch of government for a court of impeachments: "[I]t would tend to increase the complexity of the political machine, and to add a new spring to the government."89 In a different Federalist Paper, he claimed that a single-body legislature would be a dangerous machine both because of its weakness and because of its power: "[E]ither the machine, from the intrinsic feebleness of its structure, will moulder into pieces, in spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop it; or, by successive augmentations of its force and energy, ... we shall finally accumulate in a single body all the most important prerogatives of sovereignty ... "90 A well-running government, then, must be a wellbalanced machine with all of its parts working in harmony.
In contrast to the conventional metaphorical field of the body, the machine field places man in control of the system of government, makes him a planner of a complex design rather than an unwitting 
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C. Reinvention of the Field of the Body
The body metaphor survived not only the death of Charles I, but also another symbolic beheading: the severing of the British crown from its American colonies. Historians' accounts suggest that usage of the body metaphor waned at the end of the seventeenth century, but there are numerous examples of the metaphor in late eighteenth-century American writing; the body metaphor and the machine metaphor coexisted during this period in American history. The body metaphor in this literature seems at first reading to have lost some of its forceindeed, it has lost some of its authoritarian significance. In the new American republic, the legislature is the head and all of the parts are interdependent. The survival of the body metaphor illustrates how a conventional metaphor can change over time, how each use of a metaphor can subtly reshape its meaning.
Writers began playing with and testing the body metaphor as early as the mid-seventeenth century, the period when the metaphor first came under attack by the opponents of King Charles 1.92 In eighteenth-century America, the metaphor was often employed to warn of disease in the body politic. For instance, a Constitutional Convention delegate, wary of repeating the British mistakes that helped drive the colonists to revolt, warned that "[a] Vice in the Representation, like an error in the first concoction, must be followed by disease, convulsions, and finally death itself."93 James Madison in the Federalist Papers compared America's consideration of different systems of government to a sick patient's consideration of conflicting medical advice.94 It is not surprising, given the colonists' break from a government that they 91 Arguably, the body is an appropriate metaphor for society as a whole, and the machine is an appropriate metaphor for governmental structure. Nevertheless, the distinction between society and government is difficult to sustain: in the eighteenth century, the people themselves ultimately became an important "institution" of government.
92 See supra pp. I841-42. Hobbes's Leviathan, first published in 1651, defends the idea of the sovereign's absolute power over his subjects; nevertheless, the work provides an interesting variation on the body politic metaphor that anticipates eighteenth-century developments. For Hobbes, the state is an artificial man: "For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 81 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books I978) (I65I). Hobbes seems to use the word "artificial" primarily to indicate that he is creating a metaphor rather than asserting an identity, but he also uses the conflation of man and machine "to predispose the reader to accept the natural origin as well as the necessity of" the political system that he espouses. Saccaro-Battisti, supra note 55, at 35. One of the subdivisions of Hume's machine-world is the human body, and numerous writers also described the body as a machine.107 102 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 360-61 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., I96I) ("The countenance of the government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed.'); Huntington, supra note 96, at 25 (interrupting an extended body metaphor to express the hope "that all the wheels in church and state ... may be ... harmoniously turned . . ., the whole machine moved together in the most glorious order" In order for the government/body/machine to continue to function, each part must perform its discrete task in coordination with every other part of the system. The machine is man-made -but its makers are mirroring the laws that they see reflected in the human body and the natural world."' In the case of both the body and the machine, some external force may set up the system, but once it is set in motion it is propelled by the interaction of the forces inherent within it.
In fact, the strong impulse to see a polarity, to assign the body metaphor and the machine metaphor conflicting rather than complementary significances, is anachronistic. Leo Marx has recognized this anachronism in his study of American literature: he acknowledges "our own feeling . . . that 'organic' nature is the opposite of things 'mechanical,'" but argues that "it is impossible to appreciate the domi- There are few words whose shifting connotations register the revolution in thought and feeling we call the 'romantic movement' more clearly than 'mechanism.' Once the influence of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Carlyle had been felt in America, no writer ... would find it possible to use 'mechanism' in the unself-conscious, honorific sense in which [eighteenth-century writers] used it.114 The Romantics thus bestowed on us a dominant paradigm of our own: the organic/mechanical opposition. As Part I of this Note illustrates, it is as difficult for twentieth-century historians to fight their way out of this paradigm, which shapes both the questions they ask and the answers at which they arrive, as it was for seventeeth-century Parliamentarians to struggle against the paradigm of the king-as-head.
The recognition of the organic/mechanical opposition as a paradigm rather than a truism allows us to look at the eighteenth-century use of body and machine metaphors with fresh eyes. The paradigm is ours, but it was not theirs; their transformation of the body metaphor allowed them to see both man and machine as a sort of shorthand for the laws of balance that they believed drove the universe.
If the two metaphors meant similar things to the founders, does the apparent prevalence of machine language have any significance? The increasing use of machine language in late eighteenth-century America is a rhetorical shift that can be explained by scientific developments and the increasing prevalence of technology in daily life, although the Industrial Revolution in America was still decades away. This rhetorical shift laid the groundwork for further changes in meaning, as the machine began to take on the negative connotations ascribed to it by the Romantics and still prevalent today. Nevertheless, characterizing the machine language of the founding generation as a radical shift misconstrues the complex and intertwining metaphorical fields of the period. Recognizing the survival and transformation of the body metaphor in late eighteenth-century American political thought is crucial to a complete understanding of the paradigm that shaped the thoughts of the men who designed the American government. 
